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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* 
LAURIE P. WALL, * 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, * Case No. 20060312-CA 
* 
vs. * 
* Trial Court Case: 994908054 DA 
CORY R. WALL, * 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee. * 
* 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this brief there are two volumes that are transcripts of proceedings in the lower 
court. "R. 1204/Trl" refers to the first volume from proceedings held on November 1, 
2006. "R. 1205/Tr2" refers to the second volume from proceedings held March 17, 2006. 
"R" refers to the record of the court and "Ex" refers to exhibit, followed by the exhibit 
number. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Appellant shall be designated as the "Respondent" and the Appellee shall be designated 
at the "Petitioner," consistent with the parties' designations in the lower court. 
1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to the provisions of Section 
Auiciv ••>: the UuiM c onstitution, Kuk »,
 (!,^  i i.ii, Kuics ol Appellate Procedure, 
I.I '.7X-">M- \ I ll.i'i < «*«!• Vnnotalcd 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARDS FOR REVIEW 
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REDUCE OR 
TERMINATE THE RESPONDENT'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION TO THE 
PETITIONER. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
a) The trial court's interpretation of binding case law is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the lower court's 
interpretation. State v. Richardson, 843 i Jtah app. iV92Y 
b) The correctness of error standard means that no particular deferens i, 
given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932 (Utah 1994). 
c) Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly 
erroneous standard. Pena at 936; 
B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
RETROACTIVELY APPLY THE CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION PROVIDED 
FOR IN UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-45-9.3(4). 
2 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
a) The trial court's interpretation of case law presents a question of law and 
the appellate court reviews the trial court's interpretation of that law for 
correctness. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1992); 
b) The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2dl355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
c) Whether a statute operates retroactively is a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness without any deference to the trial court. Evans & 
Sutherland Computer Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 953 P.2d 
435 (Utah 1997). 
d) The Court of Appeals accords the lower court's statutory interpretations 
no particular deference, but assesses them for correctness as it would any 
other conclusion of law. 
C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
a) The trial court's interpretations of rules of procedure is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 
1993); 
3 
Ii| W'lnlt ,' 'i ii-\\ of drni.'il I ii in iliun I,'i ii v 111; 11 i ninth' 111 u K i an .ihiiM 
of discretion standard, if the trial court made a determination of law that 
provides the premise for denial of a new trial, such legal decision is 
'•"> > • > • - • '! ' : I ' ; \ K>okt>Uni u i l i t in:-), i M i l . , c • 
P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah 1993). 
D. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
! ;H 'OHII' PITITIONI-'R. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
a) The trial court's interpretation of case law presents a question of law and the 
•- . U i - ' S S . 
State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App. 1992); 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following authorities are set forth in detail in the appendix due to their length: 
1 $30-3-5(8)(g)(I) Utah Code Annotated. 
. r ...si. Ian ( ode Annotated. 
3. §78-45-9.3(4) Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SI ATIMKNI ()l TNIK ASI, 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the Order Modifying Decree 
of Divorce and Judgment and Order Denying Respondent's Motion for New Trial of the 
M .•>•!« • c^pondent's petition to modify his child support obligation to 
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the Petitioner but denied his petition to reduce or terminate his alimony obligation to the 
Petitioner; denied his request that the child support modification be made retroactive to 
the month following date of service of the Petition to Modify on the Petitioner pursuant 
to the provisions of §78-45-9.3(4); denied his request for an award of attorney's fees; and 
awarding Petitioner a judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of $3,972.50. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On November 1, 2005, the Respondent's 
Verified Motion for Modification of Decree of Divorce came on for trial before the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, District Court Judge, presiding. 
Following a one day trial, the court granted that portion of the Respondent's petition 
wherein he was seeking a reduction in his child support obligation to the Petitioner. The 
trial denied, however, the Respondent's request that his alimony obligation to the 
Petitioner be either reduced or terminated; and that the reduction in his child support be 
made retroactive to the month following service of the petition to modify on the 
Petitioner. 
The trial court took under advisement the parties' respective requests for an award 
of attorney's fees. After the parties submitted their affidavits of attorney's fees incurred, 
the trial court ordered that Petitioner be awarded a judgment for attorney's fees in the 
amount of $3,972.50. 
The Order Modifying Decree of Divorce and Judgment was entered by the trial 
court on January 16, 2006. (R. 1106-1109) 
Following the entry of the Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce, the 
Respondent filed with the trial court his Motion for New Trial which came on for hearing 
5 
hrtf.i- *'. . I / ,, 2006 1 1 le R espoi idei it's i i i >tioi I \ < • as denied I 
1189) 
( DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: Following the trial on November 1, 
entered its Order Modifying Decree of Divorce and Judgment which provides in pertinent 
part the following: 
his child support obligation to the Petitioner was granted and the decree was modified to 
provide that the Respondent's child support obligation to the Petitioner be reduced to 
$97^ '(it i .iiiiiilliiiiL ilVerlivHK-ieniUr I MM)1. 
! All other provisions of the decree not specifically modified by the order are to 
remain in full force and effect. 
3 1 1 le IVI i l innn vu i awnrdnl |iid;'mrnl lot Ilia Jill »i(it1,(\ s i a s in (In: aiiiumil « I 
$3,972.50 against the Respondent. 
* i EMENT OF FA< ' I •'•. 
The parties to this action were originally UUIHU ii *> 
City, Utah. (R. 545. 1OQP ~. 1204/R. 1204/Trl. 9). fhe parties separated in February, 
i ^^ eiiuoner later initiating the divorce action in 
December, 1999 (R. 1) They were subsequently divorced pursuan I \ v n v :*. 
entered by the court on or about November 2, 2000. (R. 555-563, 1098). Said Decree of 
. c reflected the terms and conditions of a settlement agreement entered into and 
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signed by the parties at a mediation held on September 1, 2000. (R. 523-534, 1098) The 
agreement which was reached by the parties occurred after and was the result of extended 
negotiations between them, with each of them being represented by competent counsel. 
(R. 546; R. 1204/R. 1204/Trl. 36) 
At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the parties had been married for 
19 years. There are three children born as issue of the marriage, to-wit: Jennifer Laurie 
Wall, born November 14, 1987 (now age 18); Natalie Ann Wall, born April 21, 1993 
(now age 13); and, Emily Corinne Wall, bom September 19, 1995 (now age 10). (R. 545, 
1098) 
As agreed by the parties and as set forth in the Decree of Divorce, the parties were 
awarded the joint legal custody of their children with the Petitioner being awarded the 
primary physical custody subject to the Respondent's parent-time rights. (R. 527-528, 
556, 1098) 
At the time of the mediation and execution of the settlement agreement and entry 
of the Decree of Divorce, the parties had been separated for over one and half years 
during which time the Petitioner was unemployed and had no income. (R. 503, 504, 545; 
R. 1204/Trl. 10, 12) However, at the time of the marriage, she was employed full-time 
(R. 1204/Trl. 9, 10) and during the course of the marriage, she held numerous jobs and 
was gainfully employed for much of the marriage earning as much as $20.00 per hour. 
(R491-498; R. 1204/Trl. 23) 
The Respondent is self employed as an attorney. Due to the nature of his practice 
as a self employed individual, his income has fluctuated. At the time of the divorce, the 
7 
Respondent's most current and accurate income information consisted of his 1999 
income tax returns which reflected a gross annual income of $56,808.00 which equated to 
a gross monthly income of $4,734.00 (R. 1099). 
Among the many issues involved in the case and those which pertain to the 
Respondent's petition to modify and this appeal is the fact that it was agreed between the 
parties that the Respondent would pay alimony to the Petitioner in the amount of $800.00 
per month which the Petitioner agreed was an acceptable alimony award. (R. 531, 550, 
560, 1098; R. 1204/Trl. 94) 
It was further agreed and ordered that Respondent would pay child support to the 
Petitioner in the amount of $1,200.00 per month. (R. 528, 556, 1098) Said child support 
amount was based upon the Respondent's average gross monthly income at the time with 
no income being imputed to the Petitioner as she was unemployed. (R. 536-537) It 
exceeded the Child Support Guidelines by approximately $30.00 per month. (R. 1099) 
Following the execution of the settlement agreement and the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce, the Petitioner, rather than seeking any employment, entered the University of 
Utah in the fall of 2000. (R. 1204/Trl. 12) She completed her studies in August, 2003, 
receiving a bachelors degree in speech communications at that time. (R. 1204/Trl. 13, 17, 
80) 
The Respondent filed the subject Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce 
on March 3, 2003 seeking a termination or reduction in his alimony obligation pursuant 
to §30-3-5(8)(g)(I) Utah Code Annotated and a reduction in his child support obligation 
to the Petitioner pursuant to §78-45-7.2(8)(b) Utah Code Annotated. (R. 564-574) The 
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Petitioner was served with the Summons and Verified Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce on March 4, 2004 (R. 575-577) Said petition was based upon the Respondent's 
claim of Petitioner's substantial and material change in her circumstances due to her 
having obtained a college degree and becoming available and more qualified to obtain 
employment and earn an income with which she could support herself and assist in the 
support of the parties' minor children. (R. 566, 567) 
After the Respondent's initiation of the petition to modify, the Petitioner finally 
did make efforts to become employed and had, in fact, been intermittently employed 
during the pendency of the modification action earning as much as $3,167.00 per month 
as recently as July, 2005. (R. 1099; R. 1204/Trl. 13, 15) As of the date of trial in the 
modification action, Petitioner was employed full time, earning a gross annual salary of 
$32,000 which equates to a gross monthly income of $2666.00 (R. 1204/Trl. 17; R. 942, 
1100) 
At the time of the trial on Respondent's Petition to Modify, he had a gross annual 
income, after deducting reasonable business expenses, of $56,472.00 which equates to a 
gross monthly income of $4,706.00. This amount is reflective of the Respondent's 
current ability to earn. (R. 1100) 
This matter came on for trial on November 1, 2005, on Respondent's Verified 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce wherein the Respondent sought a termination or 
reduction in his alimony obligation to the Petitioner as well as a reduction in his child 
support obligation as a result of the Petitioner's graduation from college and subsequent 
employment. 
9 
Petitioner asserted and claimed throughout the modification proceeding that 
neither the alimony nor the child support obligations of the Respondent were subject to 
change and should remain in place as set forth in the Decree of Divorce and contended 
that the decree should not be modified. (R. 788) 
At the conclusion of the trial on November 1, 2005, the trial court ruled and 
ordered that the Respondent's child support obligation to the Petitioner be modified based 
upon the parties' respective gross monthly incomes and applying the statutory child 
support guidelines. Respondent's child support obligation was reduced to $977.00 per 
month effective December 1, 2005. (R. 1204/Trl. 139, 141) 
However, the court declined to apply the child support modification retroactively 
as allowed under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9.3(4). (R. 1204/Trl. 
141; R. 1101) The trial court made a finding that the implementation of the retroactivity 
provisions of §78-45-9.3(4) would adversely affect the children and that the Petitioner 
did not have the ability to pay back to the Respondent the retroactive amount of 
approximately $4,000.00. (R. 1204/Trl. 141, 142; R. 1101) 
With respect to the alimony issue, the court declined to modify the Respondent's 
alimony obligation to the Petitioner and determined that said alimony award should 
remain, consistent with the provisions of the Decree of Divorce. (R. 1204/Trl. 139). In 
rendering its decision at the time of the trial, the court commented that the stipulations, 
the findings and the decree stand on their own and are clear and that it would not consider 
things which went into the parties' settlement negotiations at the time of the original 
mediation. (R. 1204ATrl. 140, lines 6 - 9). 
10 
However, it then went on to address the needs of the Petitioner which existed at 
the time of the decree and made a finding that there is nothing in the Stipulation, Findings 
or Decree that led the court to believe the Petitioner agreed to the original alimony award 
of $800.00 per month because it was enough to meet her needs. (R. 1204/Trl. 142, line 
25; 143, lines 1 - 3; R. 1102) The court then went on to accept the Petitioner's claimed 
living expenses contained in her Financial Declaration filed at the time of the divorce and 
make a finding that the $800.00 per month alimony award did not meet her needs at the 
time of the divorce. (R. 1204/Trl. 143, lines 3 - 23; R. 1101, 1102). 
The court then took the parties' respective requests for attorney's fees under 
advisement after allowing the parties to submit their respective fee affidavits and 
requiring them to submit proof of what each of the parties had actually paid in attorney's 
fees. (R. 1204/Trl. 101, 139, 146) After each of the parties had submitted their affidavits 
and exchanged objections and responses thereto, the court awarded the Petitioner 
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,972.50. (R. 1106) 
On January 20, 2006, the Respondent filed his Motion for New Trial pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting that a new trial be 
held on the issues of the Respondent's requested reduction/termination of alimony, 
retroactive application of the child support award, and the award of attorney's fees. (R, 
1113). 
The hearing on Respondent's motion came on for hearing before the trial court on 
March 17, 2006. (R. 1186; R. 1205/Tr2. 3). At that time, the trial court denied the 
Respondent's motion. (R. 1205/Tr2. 20, line 6). It then went on to hold that it could look 
11 
at the Petitioner's current living expenses which Respondent had argued should not be 
considered. (R. 1205/Tr2. page 20, line 9). Further, the court held that if there are 
findings in a decree that don't detail what the alimony is for, what it's to cover, what the 
expenses are and what the incomes are of the parties, then it has the right to do that at the 
time of modification and "go back and recreate that." (R. 1205/Tr2., page 20, lines 18-
22). The court acknowledged that what it had done was to go back and look at the 
Petitioner's expenses at the time of the divorce and her present income now, plus the 
alimony, and found that it still wasn't sufficient to meet the Petitioner's needs. In so 
doing, it determined that the alimony should not be terminated. (R. 1205/Tr2., page 21, 
lines 10-15). The Order denying the Respondent's motion was entered on March 28, 
2006. (R. 1187). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Respondent contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the terms of 
the settlement agreement which was reached at the time of the divorce by re-writing 
factual findings into that agreement after considering the Petitioner's Financial 
Declaration submitted at the time of the divorce. The trial court found that, after 
considering the Petitioner's claimed living expenses as set forth in that Financial 
Declaration, the original alimony award was not sufficient to meet her needs, despite the 
fact the Petitioner had agreed to accept the ordered amount. Respondent submits and 
claims that the Petitioner's needs were negotiated and established at the time of the 
divorce as set forth in the settlement agreement by accepting the sum of $800.00 per 
month in alimony. 
12 
2. Respondent also contends the trial court erred by finding that the Petitioner had 
not experienced a substantial material change in circumstances not contemplated in the 
decree of divorce. Respondent contends that the decree did not contemplate the 
Petitioner's changed circumstances which included her graduation from college and 
obtaining employment. 
3. In rendering its decision denying the Respondent's petition to terminate or 
reduce alimony, the trial court considered the Petitioner's current needs which did not 
exist at the time of the divorce. Respondent contends that by so doing, the trial accepted 
and considered evidence contrary to the provisions of §30-3-5(8)(g)(ii). 
4. In granting the Respondent's petition to reduce his child support obligation, the 
trial court declined to make said reduction retroactive pursuant to the provisions of §78-
45-9.3(4) Utah Code Annotated. Respondent contends that the provisions of this statute 
are mandatory in nature and require the trial court to make any adjustments in child 
support and alimony awards which are part of a child support order retroactive to the 
month following the date of service of the summons and petition to modify. 
5. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new 
trial which was made on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence and surprise. 
Respondent submits that the trial court erred by considering the Petitioner's claimed 
living expenses both at the time of the divorce and at the time of the trial on the petition 
to modify and that the same constituted surprise which was not contemplated by the 
Respondent. Further, by considering said evidence, the Respondent submits that it was 
13 
insufficient to support the trial court's denial of his petition to reduce or terminate 
alimony. 
6. The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the Petitioner after the conclusion of 
the trial on the petition to modify. At that time, the court failed to make any detailed 
factual findings as to the ability of the Respondent to pay those fees and the need of the 
Petitioner be awarded the same. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REDUCE OR TERMINATE 
THE RESPONDENT'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION TO THE PETITIONER BASED 
UPON THE PETITIONER'S SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
It is well settled and established law in this state that an award of alimony is 
subject to modification upon a showing of a substantial material change in circumstances 
since the entry of the decree of divorce and not contemplated in the decree itself. Bolliger 
v. Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Ut.App. 2000). Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8)(g)(I) 
provides in pertinent part: "The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." 
In Bolliger this court stated: 
This court has articulated what is meant by "contemplated by the divorce decree": 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial 
material change in circumstances] in their own minds or in their 
discussions does not mean that the decree itself contemplates the 
change. In order for a material change in circumstances to be 
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contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, 
preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that 
the trial court anticipated the specific change. Durfee v. Durfee, 796 
P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 1990). (Emphasis added) 
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any 
reference to the changed circumstances at issue in the petition to modify, 
then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated in the 
original divorce decree. Id. at 906. 
More recently, this court reiterated the same rule in Smith v. Smith, WL 1405478, 
Utah App. 1005 (June 16, 2005) when it stated: "In order for a material change in 
circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, preferably 
in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the 
specific change." quoting Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716. 
In this action, the Respondent maintained that the Petitioner experienced a 
substantial material change in her circumstances not contemplated in the decree of 
divorce. Specifically, the Petitioner, at the time of the divorce was unemployed and had 
no income. Since the entry of the decree, she has returned to school, obtained a degree, 
and is now employed. 
Respondent maintains that while Petitioner has always been capable of working 
and supporting herself, she was not so employed at the time of the settlement agreement 
or at the time of the entry of the decree. Petitioner has taken the position that her going to 
college and later returning to work were somehow contemplated at the time of the decree. 
However, such a claim is baseless and is not supported by a review of the record. Neither 
the settlement agreement which was prepared by Petitioner's counsel and signed by the 
parties, nor the decree of divorce itself makes any reference whatsoever regarding any 
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plans or contemplation that the Petitioner would go to college to obtain a degree and/or 
return to work. As the record in this case is, in fact, "bereft of any reference to the 
changed circumstances at issue in the petition to modify/' then they were not 
contemplated in the decree. 
There is nothing in the decree that contemplates this situation. The child support 
was set according to the Respondent's income only. In this regard, it was contemplated 
that the Petitioner would have no income at all. If the possibility of future income by the 
Petitioner had been contemplated there would likely have been pertinent language in the 
settlement agreement and the decree addressing this issue. There was not. There was no 
credible evidence presented that Petitioner's increase in income was ever even 
contemplated by the parties let alone in the decree itself. In addition, nothing in the 
decree precludes the consideration of additional income as a basis for a substantial 
change in circumstances warranting a modification petition. 
In the few cases that have ever held a significant increase in income was 
contemplated by the decree, there is, on the record, strong evidence that the increase in 
income was not only contemplated but expected. Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 729 (Ut. 
App. 1990). In Dana the court explicitly stated an expectation of significant growth in 
the alimony receiver's income. Such express contemplations were used to determine the 
obligations of the decree, including the amount of child support. Id. 
The courts have reinforced this idea of requiring explicit statements regarding 
future income. "We do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have parties 
arguing years after the fact over what a trial court may or may not have considered when 
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making an alimony award . . . the trial court must make findings indicating that the future 
income has [or has not] been considered in making the present award. Such finding will 
then allow the paying spouse to bring a modification proceeding at the appropriate time." 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 253-54 (Ut. App. 1993). Also, "since the divorce 
decree at issue did not have a provision expressly anticipating an increase in 
Respondent's income, and since Respondent did not offer any evidence at trial that the 
trial court had previously anticipated the increase in income when the original divorce 
decree was entered, we find that the increase was not a material change in circumstances 
contemplated in the original divorce decree." Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716. 
A vague reference in the original Findings of Fact that the Petitioner was an 
unemployed student is not, by any stretch of the imagination, an explicit or express 
reference to any contemplation that the Petitioner would one day complete her college 
degree and get a job. Neither the settlement agreement nor the divorce decree contain 
any express language regarding a future expectation or contemplation that the Petitioner's 
income would increase. Had Petitioner truly contemplated a substantial increase in 
income it would have been very easily included in the settlement agreement and the 
decree and equity would certainly require as much. However, the facts support the 
opposite. She agreed $800 was the amount required to support her standard of living 
with no additional language that any increased income was contemplated or expected. 
There are no provisions in the stipulation, findings or decree that it was expected that the 
Petitioner would graduate from college, obtain employment, or have any income other 
than the alimony and child support she agreed to accept from the Respondent. 
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Looking at the Petitioner's actions over the last several years and the Respondent's 
testimony, it is clear that the parties never contemplated a substantial increase in 
Petitioner's income; let alone the fact that the decree itself is completely devoid of any 
language supporting this assertion. 
At the time of the divorce there was no assurance that the Petitioner would ever 
finish her schooling or ever get a job. The record reflects that during the period of over 
one and half years the parties were separated prior to the entry of the decree, the 
Petitioner remained unemployed. During that time, she could have obtained employment 
but chose not to. In the fall of 1999 and spring of 2000 she enrolled in and later dropped 
classes at the University of Utah. As of September 1, 2000 when the parties attended 
mediation and signed the settlement agreement, the Petitioner was not attending school 
nor was she working. There was no indication at that time that she was intent on 
becoming enrolled as a full time student or that she would ever follow through and 
complete her education or that she intended to get a job. 
As such, the Petitioner's obtaining of a college degree and subsequent 
employment were and are substantial material changes in circumstances giving rise to 
Respondent's claim for either a termination or reduction in his alimony obligation to the 
Petitioner. 
Respondent submits that the Petitioner's employment constitutes a substantial 
material change in circumstances. In Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982) 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the change in circumstances required to justify a 
modification of a divorce decree varies with the type of modification sought. And, in the 
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instance of modification of alimony, it held that where the former wife had become 
employed, experienced a substantial increase in her income and had accumulated some 
savings, such circumstances qualified as being substantial and material. It should further 
be noted that the husband's income was about the same as it was at the time of the 
divorce. 
The Petitioner in this case has, as mentioned previously, become employed, is 
making substantially more than her previous income which is the alimony payments 
made by the Respondent, and she has accumulated some savings. Respondent's income 
has remained virtually unchanged. 
In Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaughu 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990) this court upheld 
a termination of an alimony award under circumstances virtually identical to those 
present in this case. In that case, the wife was not employed at the time of the divorce 
and had no income from outside sources. During the four years after the divorce, she did 
not work but instead went to college and obtained a Master's degree in social work. 
Thereafter, she became employed and worked for Granite School District. At the time of 
trial in that action, the wife was receiving approximately $22,000.00 per year from her 
employment and other sources. The husband, on the other hand, had also experienced a 
significant increase in his income, earning approximately eight times what he was 
earning at the time of the divorce and his net worth had increased forty times. 
The court held that it was appropriate to terminate alimony as it was satisfied that 
the recipient spouse was now able to support herself at a level approximating the level 
she enjoyed during the marriage despite the dramatic increase in the husband's post 
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decree income. The court noted that the purpose of alimony is to allow the recipient 
spouse a standard of living as close as possible to that experienced during the marriage, 
not to provide subsequent improvements to keep pace with those of the payor spouse. Id. 
at 243. 
In addition, the Petitioner has maintained throughout these proceedings that the 
alimony award in this case is "permanent'' and not subject to modification. Such a claim 
is likewise without any legal basis. In Smith, cited supra, the court noted that an award 
of "permanent alimony" may be modified upon appropriate petition. Id. quoting Munns 
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
POINT II 
COURT CANNOT ISSUE OR MODIFY ALIMONY BASED ON NEEDS OF 
RECIPIENT SPOUSE WHICH DID NOT EXIST AT TIME OF DIVORCE 
At the trial, the Petitioner submitted and the court accepted her current Financial 
Declaration which shows significantly higher living expenses than those that existed at 
the time of the divorce and some which did not even exist at that time. Obviously, this 
was done in an attempt to show a justification for continued alimony when, in fact, based 
on her own income and the addition of child support, Petitioner should easily be able to 
maintain a standard of living equal to that at the time of the divorce. 
At the time of the divorce Petitioner agreed that $800 per month in alimony 
together with the child support would be sufficient to meet her needs. Since that time and 
up to the point when she became employed, she had established that such was the case. 
The only significant debt she incurred during that period were student loans she obtained 
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in order to attend schooling which she chose to do instead of obtaining employment 
which she was more than qualified to do. This fact alone is telling as to her needs. 
Petitioner is now earning more than three times the alimony amount and yet she claims 
she still needs the additional income in the form of ongoing alimony. This leads one to 
question, if she has so much more income, how can she still require a supplemental 
source? The answer is straightforward; she is claiming expenses that were not a part of 
her standard of living at the time of the divorce. 
The consideration of these current expenses by the trial court in determining 
whether to maintain the current alimony award is erroneous. Utah Code Annotated §30-
3-5(8)(g)(ii) provides: 
The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address 
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
In Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 86 P.3d 767 (Utah App. 2004), the recipient had 
become permanently disabled and unable to work to support herself. It indicated that this 
type of situation was an example of what constituted "extenuating circumstances" in order 
to consider post divorce needs. The Petitioner has suffered no such circumstances which 
would warrant a consideration of her current needs/expenses. In fact, quite the opposite 
is true in her situation. She was unemployed and had no income at the time of the 
divorce and now has a college degree, is employed Ml time and earning a significant 
income. 
In this case, the Petitioner has, since the entry of the decree of divorce, increased 
her mortgage indebtedness on her home, incurred student loans, personal medical bills 
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and other claimed expenses that did not exist at the time of the decree of divorce. The 
court cannot, under the above referenced authority, consider these items when 
considering an alimony award to the Petitioner. In essence, the court should only 
consider the need expressed by the Petitioner herself in the settlement agreement of 
$800.00 per month for alimony. Inasmuch as she is now earning approximately three and 
one-half times the amount of the existing alimony award, the Respondent should be 
entitled to a termination of his alimony obligation to the Petitioner. 
Further, the court cannot award alimony to the Petitioner in an amount more than 
her established needs. In Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah App. 1994), 
the court held that the trial court in that case should not have awarded to the recipient 
spouse more than her established needs required, regardless of the payor spouse's ability 
to pay any excess amount. (Emphasis added). 
The practical effect of considering the Petitioner's increased current living 
expenses and claiming that her increased income was contemplated in the decree of 
divorce as a justification for continuing the Respondent's alimony obligation is to 
basically disregard the original Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and re-do it. The 
decree did not expressly contemplate the Petitioner's increase in income. Petitioner 
agreed that $800 in alimony together with the original $1,200 in child support would 
meet her needs. This was a court sanctioned agreement and one entered into by the 
parties who were both represented by legal counsel. Petitioner has now been able to 
actually increase her standard of living by obtaining a college degree and obtaining 
employment. 
22 
Petitioner now wants the court to go back and, in essence, controvert the facts 
existing at the time of the divorce, and claim that the agreed upon alimony was 
insufficient and that it must have been contemplated that she would be working to 
support herself; none of which is referred to in any way in the language of the decree. 
In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court discussed a 
similar situation as it pertains to a stipulated decree of divorce. There, the court held that 
"when a decree is based upon a property settlement agreement, forged by the parties and 
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such agreement into consideration. Equity is 
not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply 
because one has come to regret the bargain made." Id. at 1250-51 
It is inherently unfair and unjust to now claim that for some reason, not articulated 
in the decree, Petitioner truly needed more support than agreed to and that her subsequent 
earnings of more than three times that amount could not constitute a substantial change in 
circumstances. The terms of the agreement and the decree were premised on the fact that 
the Petitioner was not employed and had no income. Both parties agreed to this and the 
court sanctioned the agreement. 
Furthermore, Respondent contends that had the court made an accurate and 
appropriate evaluation of the parties' respective financial positions, it should have, at the 
very least performed an income equalization analysis. The Petitioner's net monthly 
income, including her receipt of child support is $3,287.42. The Respondent's net 
monthly income, after paying the modified child support to the Petitioner is now 
$3,206.58, resulting in Petitioner receiving $80.84 more per month than does the 
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Respondent. When the Respondent is then obligated to continue paying alimony of 
$800.00, the disparity becomes that much greater and is that much less equitable. 
POINT III 
PETITIONER'S NEEDS AT TIME OF DIVORCE WERE 
AGREED TO BY STIPULATION AND CANNOT BE 
RE-DETERMINED IN MODIFICATION PROCEEDING 
Respondent asserts that the trial court erred in considering the Petitioner's August 
2000 Financial Declaration. In this case, the parties entered into a binding Stipulation 
and Settlement Agreement at the time of the divorce, settling all issues including the 
payment of an alimony award to the Petitioner in the amount of $800.00 per month. The 
terms of that agreement are reflected and contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce. Respondent contends and maintains that this amount 
was agreed to by the parties, particularly the Petitioner, as sufficient to meet the needs of 
the Petitioner. 
The trial court was correct in stating that at the time of the divorce there were no 
findings as to the specific needs of the Petitioner (R. 1204/Trl., page 142, lines 21-22). 
The trial court was also correct in an earlier statement that the "stipulations, the findings 
and the decree, I believe, stand on their own and are clear" in stating that it did not 
consider what things went into the parties' settlement negotiations. (R. 1204/Trl., page 
140, lines 6-8). 
However, where the trial court erred is when it then examined, in detail, the 
Petitioner's Financial Declaration filed in 2000 in making a determination that the $800 
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alimony amount which the parties had agreed to in mediation did not meet the needs of 
the Petitioner. In fact, at the hearing on Respondent's motion for new trial held on 
March 17, 2006 the judge stated: "And if I have findings in a decree that don't detail 
what - what the alimony is for, what it's to cover, what the expenses are and what the 
incomes are of the parties, then I think what we have to do at the modification trial is 
go back and recreate that." (R. 1205/Tr2., page 20, lines 18-22)(Emphasis added) 
Such a determination by the trial court is clearly erroneous and contrary to the 
established case law on this issue. The trial court, in essence, went behind the original 
agreement of the parties which had been entered into five years earlier, and re-wrote it in 
making a finding that the agreed upon amount did not meet the Petitioner's needs. 
In doing so, the court completely circumvented the entire mediation process and 
all that went into it. 
In Davis v. Davis, 29 P.3d 676, (Utah App. 2001) this court quite clearly stated the 
rule as it pertains to this very issue. It held: 
[A stipulation] has all the binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions of 
law made by the court upon the evidence. The rationale is that the stipulation 
constitutes an agreement of the parties that all the facts necessary to 
support i t . . . pre-existed and would be sustained by available evidence, 
had not the agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking of evidence. 
(Citing United Factors v. T.C. Assocs., Inc., 21 Utah 2d 351, 354, 445 P.2d 766, 
768 (1968) (Emphasis added). 
In this case and applying the holding in Davis, the Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement which was signed by the parties constituted an agreement that all of the facts 
necessary to support it, including what the Petitioner's needs were with respect to 
alimony, would be sustained and were sustainable by available evidence at that time. It is 
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clearly an erroneous ruling by the trial court to, after the fact and five years later, make 
some determination that the facts used to support the stipulation were something other 
than what they actually were and in essence, re-write the agreement between the parties. 
The purpose of mediation is to take the court out of the loop and allow the parties 
to engage in arms length discussions and negotiations. It is the process of exchanging 
information, give and take, and in many respect replaces or constitutes the aspect of 
cross-examination which would otherwise occur at trial. Based upon the facts known to 
the parties at the time of mediation, and with the advice of legal counsel, they entered 
into an agreement whereby the Petitioner agreed to accept the sum of $800.00 per month 
in alimony together with a child support award of $1,200.00. 
By disregarding the stipulation, findings and decree which, in the words of the 
trial court itself, "stand on their own and are clear" it re-inserted itself into the loop, 
making a finding which was contrary to what the parties had previously agreed upon 
based the information they had at the time of the mediation and execution of the 
settlement agreement. 
In Bennett v. Bennett, 2005 WL 3315331 (Utah App.) 2005 UT App 528, Dec. 8, 
2005, this court, which cited Davis, supra, held that by entering into a stipulation, the 
parties implicitly agree with the underlying facts and that a trial court and the parties are 
bound by the parties' stipulation. Citing Yeargin, Inc., v. Tax Commission, 2001 UT 11, 
U19, 20 P.3d 281. The court held that given the stipulation which the parties had entered 
into, the trial court would not be able to receive other evidence contrary to the stipulation. 
Id 
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Accordingly, the trial court was not and should not have considered other evidence 
which is contrary to the stipulation. This would include any evidence regarding the 
Petitioner's claimed living expenses at the time of the divorce which were in dispute, 
never litigated, and never found to be valid or accurate in any way. Not that he should 
have been required to do so, given the opportunity, Respondent submits that he would 
have been able to clearly establish the inaccuracy of the Petitioner's claimed expenses at 
the time of the divorce. He was never allowed that opportunity as it was assumed the 
trial court would follow the law on this issue and not consider those expenses. That issue 
was settled, set and decided by the parties as contained in the stipulation and the court 
cannot go back and re-write the agreement. 
The Petitioner agreed at the time of the mediation that $800.00 per month in 
alimony, together with what she would be receiving in the form of child support, was 
sufficient to meet her needs. Even at the trial on the modification action, the Petitioner 
herself testified that she would had requested $1,000.00 per month in alimony but in 
order to settle, agreed to accept the $800.00 amount which was ultimately included in the 
settlement agreement and the decree of divorce. (R. 1204/Trl., page 86, lines 15-17). 
It is a well settled and established principle that with respect to stipulations entered 
into between parties, they are conclusive and binding on the parties unless, upon timely 
notice and for good cause shown, relief is granted therefrom. Higley v. McDonald, 685 
P.2d 496 (Utah 1984), (Citing First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & 
Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979, and State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339 (Utah 1955). 
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In Birsa v. Birsa, 2000 WL 33244127 (Utah App.2000) this court, in addressing a 
decree of divorce which was the product of a stipulation between the parties, held: 
"[T]here is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and 
entered into with the advice of counsel." (Citing Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 
(Utah Ct.App.1989) see also In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074 (Utah 2000). 
The Settlement Agreement in this case was the product of a long and involved 
mediation session at which time the Petitioner was represented by counsel who was 
present. Petitioner's counsel himself, drafted the agreement as well as the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Petitioner should be bound 
by the terms of that agreement including the agreement that the sum of $800.00 per 
month in alimony was sufficient to meet her needs. 
The Petitioner is now employed earning almost three and one-half times the 
amount of alimony and her agreed upon needs as of the date of the divorce. She is now 
able to more than meet those needs on her own without any further support from the 
Respondent. Accordingly, alimony should be terminated. 
POINT IV 
ADJUSTMENTS IN CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY REQUIRED TO BE 
RETROACTIVE TO COMMENCEMENT OF MODIFICATION ACTION 
Under the present law, when the court orders a modification of child support and 
spousal support under a child support order, it is required to be made retroactive to the 
month following service of the summons and petition for modification. Utah Code 
Annotated §78-45-9.3(4) provides: 
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A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a modification is 
pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if 
the obligor is the Petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the 
Petitioner. If the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the 
effective date of the modification shall be the month following service on 
the parent whose support is affected. Once the tribunal determines that a 
modification is appropriate, the tribunal shall order a judgment to be 
entered for any difference in the original order and the modified amount for 
the period from the service of the pleading until the final order of 
modification is entered. (Emphasis added) 
The use of the word "shall" as contained in this statute is commonly understood to 
create a mandatory condition and it should be applied in this case. Paar v. Stubbs, 117 
P.3d 1079 (Utah App. 2005). Where a provision contains both the words "shall" and 
"may," it is presumed that the lawmaker intended to distinguish between them, "shall" 
being construed as mandatory and "may" as permissive. Scannell v. City of Seattle, 
97 Wash.2d 701, 705, 648 P.2d 435, 438 (Wash., 1982). Citing State ex rel. Public 
Disclosure Comm'n v. Rains, 87 Wash.2d 626, 633-34, 555 P.2d 1368 (1976). When an 
individual's rights depend upon giving the word "shall" an imperative construction, 
"shall" is presumed to have been used in reference to that right or benefit and it receives a 
mandatory interpretation. Jordan v. O'Brien, 79 Wash.2d 406, 410, 486 P.2d 290 (1971). 
The language of the present statute clarifies previous versions which admittedly 
gave the trial court discretion regarding the retroactivity of child support and alimony 
modifications. However, the language of the current statute clearly directs the court to 
make any modifications retroactive. 
"Our primary goal when construing statutes is to evince 'the true intent and 
purpose the Legislature [as expressed through] the plain language of the Act/ In doing 
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so, we seek 'to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful/ and we accordingly 
avoid interpretations that will render portions of the statute superfluous or inoperative." 
Hall v. Utah State Dept. Of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 958. 
The facts and analysis of a similar issue was raised and addressed in Wilde v. 
Wilde, 35 P.3d 341 (Utah App. 2001). It involved a second appeal brought by the wife 
concerning an alimony modification petition filed in 1994 and a request by her that an 
alimony modification be made retroactive to the date the petition was served. That case 
differed from this one in that during the course of those proceedings the legislature had 
modified the provisions of U.C.A. §30-3-10.6(2), which is the predecessor statute to 78-
45-9.3(4) at issue here. 
This case differs factually in that §78-45-9.3(4) was in place when Respondent 
filed his petition for modification. 
In Wilde, when the Respondent served the Petitioner with the modification 
petition, §30-3-10.6(2) provided: 
A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may 
be modified with respect to any period during which a petition for 
modification is pending, but only from the date notice of that petition 
was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the Petitioner, or to the 
obligor, if the obligee is the Petitioner. 
The court stated that it had interpreted that section to give courts discretion to 
determine both if and when a modified child support award should be made retroactive. 
Id. at 345. (Citing, Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and 
Crockett v. Crockett 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
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The provisions of section 30-3-10.6(2) were then amended and renumbered which 
provided: 
A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be 
modified with respect to any period during which a modification is 
pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the 
obligee, if the obligor is the Petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee 
is the Petitioner. The tribunal shall order a judgment for the period 
from the service of the pleading until the final order of modification 
is entered for any difference in the original order and the modified 
amount Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9.3(4) (Emphasis added) 
The amendment added the sentence requiring the trial court to order a judgment 
for the period from the service of the pleading until the final order, for any difference 
between the original award and the modified amount. Id. at 346. 
Since the holding in Wilde section 78-45-9.3(4) has been amended yet again by 
the insertion of a new second sentence which states: 
If the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the effective 
date of the modification shall be the month following service on the 
parent whose support is affected..,.(Emphasis added) 
The clear and unambiguous meaning of this amendment is a mandatory 
requirement placed on the courts to retroactively apply modified support to the month 
following service of the petition on the affected party. In the present case, this court 
ordered that the Respondent's child support obligation to the Petitioner should be 
modified in conformity with the child support guidelines using the parties' respective 
current gross monthly incomes. In doing so, the provisions of section 78-45-9.3(4) 
31 
require that modification to be implemented retroactively to the month following service 
of the petition to modify on the Petitioner which, in this case, would be April, 2004. 
It was inherently unfair and inequitable for the trial court to deny the 
Respondent's request that this statutory provision be followed. During most of the time 
this matter was pending before the trial court, the Petitioner was employed, either on her 
own or as an employee with different companies. During that time, the Respondent 
shouldered all of the child support obligation without receiving any relief as a result of 
the Petitioner having become employed and sharing in that responsibility. 
By not applying a modification retroactively, it removes any incentive on the part 
of the affected party to bring the matter to conclusion. In fact, it promotes delay and 
fosters increased litigation costs and attorney's fees. Respondent respectfully submits 
that the current provisions of section 78-45-9.3(4) required the trial court to apply the 
modified child support retroactively and, in addition, that the Respondent be awarded a 
judgment against the Petitioner for the amount in question. 
At trial, the court voiced its concern that to apply the modified support amount 
retroactively would impose a hardship on the Petitioner and the children. However, such 
is not the case, as the court could have fashioned any remedy it deemed necessary in 
order to allow the satisfaction of the judgment over a period of time or to even stay 
execution of the judgment to a later date. 
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POINT V 
NEW TRIAL IS NECESSARY WHERE COURT'S RULING 
IS BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
Under the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may 
petition the court seeking a new trial if the findings or rulings of the court in the initial 
proceeding are not supported by sufficient evidence. Rule 59 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
is against law. 
Respondent submits that in denying his petition to either reduce or terminate his 
alimony obligation, the court based its decision, to a large extent on the purported needs 
of the Petitioner as set forth in her Financial Declaration dated August 4, 2000 rather than 
what the Petitioner agreed to receive in the form of alimony when the case was settled 
through mediation. The Respondent's petition to modify the alimony award was based 
on the fact that Petitioner had obtained a college degree and, during the course of the 
proceedings, become employed earning a significant income well in excess of the 
alimony award. Neither party, particularly the Respondent, approached this matter in 
terms of what the Petitioner's expenses were at the time of the divorce but rather what the 
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Petitioner's ability was to support herself in light of her income from employment which 
she did not have at the time of the divorce and the fact that her current income is more 
than three times the current alimony award. 
The Respondent should have had and should still have the opportunity to present 
evidence concerning the Petitioner's claimed living expenses at the time of the divorce if 
the court deems that to be relevant. The court's adoption of the Petitioner's August 4, 
2000 Financial Declaration and finding that the Petitioner's claimed living expenses as 
set forth in the document were reasonable without taking any evidence as to the 
reasonableness of those expenses came as a total and complete surprise and is not 
supported by sufficient evidence or existing law as previously set forth herein. 
Respondent was unaware that the issue of the Petitioner's claimed living expenses 
at the time of the divorce was going to be re-litigated in light of the fact that said issue 
had already been negotiated and settled pursuant to the Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement. 
At no time during the initial divorce proceedings did the Respondent ever stipulate 
or otherwise agree that the living expense figures claimed by the Petitioner were accurate 
or reasonable. In fact, quite the opposite is true as evidenced by Respondent's pleadings 
filed at the time. The Petitioner's claimed living expenses were always a hotly contested 
issue during the initial proceedings and should not have been adopted by the court as 
reasonable without a sufficient showing of evidence to support the same. 
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POINT VI 
PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In this action, both parties requested an award of attorney's fees each incurred in 
the prosecution and defense of the matter. It is this Respondent's position that 
Petitioner should not have been awarded attorney's fees in any amount whatsoever. This 
is based on the fact that this Respondent filed and prosecuted his petition for modification 
of the decree of divorce in good faith and his claims have merit based upon the 
Petitioner's substantial material change in circumstances which includes her employment 
and earning an income which resulted in a decrease in the Respondents' child support 
obligation. 
There are, of course, several factors the court must consider in determining 
whether to award attorney's fees in divorce modification proceedings. In Wilde vs. 
Wilde, 35 P.3d 341, 349 (Utah App., 2001), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that: 
To recover attorney fees and costs in modification proceedings, 'the 
requesting party must demonstrate his or her need for attorney fees, the 
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees.' 
Citing, Larsen 888 P.2d at 726. Utah appellate courts have reversed 
attorney fee awards where the requesting party has failed to show any one 
of these factors. Citing Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) 
In addressing these factors as they apply to the Petitioner, she is currently 
employed and has the ability to pay her own attorney's fees. Respondent, quite frankly, 
does not have the ability to pay the Petitioner's attorney's fees in light of the fact that he 
has incurred his own fees in the prosecution of this action and has his own obligation 
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which he must meet. Finally, the amount of fees requested by the Petitioner were clearly 
unreasonable. In Wilde the court cited several factors which constitute unreasonableness 
of fees. It stated that: 
The trial court found that Respondent's requests were unreasonable 
because: (1) "it is impossible to tell from the evidence presented . . . [what] 
portion of the time expended relate[d]: to the modification and the fraud 
claim; (2) "it is impossible to tell what portion of the time was expended 
with respect to those issues upon which [Respondent]... prevailed;" (3) "it 
is very clear that [Respondent] in this case engaged in overkill to an 
enormous degree with respect to attorney time, costs, expert witnesses and 
the like;" (4) "the facts and issues in this matter were not unusually 
difficult," but Respondent worked "many more hours than what would be 
reasonable;" Wilde at 349. 
Most of these factors are applicable in this case as they pertain to the Petitioner. 
Respondent submits that the Petitioner and her counsel have engaged in "overkill to an 
enormous degree." The amount of time expended by Petitioner's counsel is greatly in 
excess of that expended by Respondent's counsel even though both have done 
comparable amounts of work in this matter. The hourly rate charged by Petitioner's 
counsel is on the high end of fees charge by attorney's practicing divorce litigation in this 
locality which results in a greatly inflated claim for fees. 
The facts and issues in this matter are not unusually difficult. Petitioner took the 
firm position throughout the proceedings, that neither the alimony nor the child support 
awards in this case were subject to modification when the law is quite clear that they are. 
Respondent had to pursue this matter through to trial as a result of the Petitioner's refusal 
to accept the applicable law in this area and even discuss a possible resolution of this 
matter. 
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POINT VII 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS IMPROPER WITHOUT 
FINDINGS OF NEED AND ABILITY TO PAY 
Respondent acknowledges that in the context of divorce proceedings, "[t]he 
decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound 
discretion of the trial court," however, the court must "base the award on evidence of the 
receiving spousefs financial need, the payor spousefs ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). "Failure to consider these factors is 
grounds for reversal on the fee issue." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P2d 438, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). "Moreover, [s]uch an award must be based on sufficient findings regarding these 
factors." Shinkoskev v. Shinkoskev, 2001 UT App 44 If 18, 19 P.3d 1005. "This enables 
an appellate court to determine if the trial court has abused its discretion. Without 
adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review." Willey v. Willey 
951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). 
In this case, the court awarded attorney's fees to the Petitioner and awarded her a 
judgment for that amount. However, in its findings of fact, the court did not make any of 
the required findings necessary to justify an award of attorney's fees. See Walters v. 
Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
There was no evidence adduced at trial regarding the factors which the court must take 
into consideration in making an award of attorney's fees. 
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In this case, the court accepted and adopted as being reasonable the Respondent's 
gross and net monthly income and his monthly living expenses. The Respondent's net 
monthly income is $4,183.58. Taking into account the reduced child support amount, his 
reasonable monthly expenses are $5,203.21 which results in a net negative cash flow 
each month of <$1,019.63>. Analyzing it another way, after paying alimony of $800 and 
child support of $977 each month to the Petitioner, the Respondent is left with only 
$2,406.58 each month to meet his own monthly living expenses which are reasonable and 
necessary. 
The Respondent's net cash intake from her employment, child support and 
alimony received totals $4,087.42. In other words, the Respondent brings in $1,680.84 
more per month than does the Petitioner. The Respondent does not have the ability to 
pay any of the Petitioner's attorney's fees after taking into consideration his current 
financial obligations and the disparity in the parties' respective net monthly incomes. 
Further, at the time of trial, the court ordered that both of the parties present their 
billing statements reflecting all payments made on the respective accounts. Respondent 
has complied. Petitioner has not. Respondent questions whether the Petitioner has even 
incurred any attorney's fees or has been obligated to pay any to her attorney. Respondent 
requests that the court order Petitioner's counsel to comply and provide a complete and 
accurate payment record of the claimed attorney's fees. 
Finally, in light of the foregoing arguments and existing case law regarding the 
termination of alimony, it is fair and reasonable that the Respondent's alimony obligation 
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to the Petitioner be terminated or, at the very least, substantially reduced. As such, the 
award of attorney's fees with the accompanying judgment should be negated in total. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, it is clear that the Petitioner experienced a substantial material change 
in circumstances which was not contemplated in the decree of divorce. At the time of the 
settlement agreement between the parties settling the divorce case, the Petitioner was not 
employed, had no income and was not in school and had not been attending school on a 
regular and consistent basis. Her subsequent attendance and completion of her college 
education and ultimate obtaining of a job were issues and facts which were not 
contemplated in the settlement agreement or the decree. There is no language that it was 
every expected or contemplated that the Petitioner would ever become employed. 
Further, the trial court erred by going around the original settlement agreement 
and making a retroactive finding that the original alimony award was not sufficient to 
meet the Petitioner's needs at the time of the divorce. It went back and looked at the 
Petitioner's Financial Declaration, the contents of which were never agreed to by the 
parties as being accurate in any way. In doing so, it completely disregarded all of the 
facts, evidence and discussions which were exchanged at the original mediation which 
produced the agreement between the parties including the Petitioner's agreement to 
accept the original alimony amount. 
While the trial court's adjustment and reduction of the Respondent's child support 
obligation to the Petitioner was consistent with the applicable laws, its refusal to make 
such adjustment retroactive to the month following service of the summons and petition 
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to modify on the Petitioner was not. Utah Code Annotated §78-45-9.3(4), supported by 
the cited authorities herein, clearly dictate and mandate that any such adjustment be made 
retroactive. 
As a result of the trial court's erroneous consideration of evidence and rulings 
which run contrary to both statutory and case law, it should have granted the 
Respondent's motion for a new trial and its decision to deny the Respondent's motion 
was in error. 
Finally, in light of the fact that the trial court made no specific findings concerning 
the issue of attorney's fees in this matter, said issue should be remanded for final 
determination. 
Based upon the foregoing authorities and arguments, the Respondent submits and 
requests that the Respondent's alimony obligation to the Petitioner should be terminated 
inasmuch as the Petitioner is now earning an income which more than triples her need at 
the time of the divorce based upon a material substantial change in her circumstances. 
Further, the child support modification should be made retroactive and the award of 
attorney's fees granted by the trial court should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //Jwoi August 2006. 
Respondent/Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
1. §30-3-5(8)(g)(I) Utah Code Annotated. 
2. §78-45-7.2(8)(b) Utah Code Annotated. 
3. §78-45-9.3(4) Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeal from order 
Attorney fees 
—Amount 
— Criteria for award 
—Findings required 
—Reasonable 
—Timing 
Appeal from order. 
An awaid of fees to the defendant was upheld 
on appeal where the plaintiff did not challenge 
any of the findings entered by the trial court in 
support of the award Bolhger v Bolhger, 997 
P2d 903 (Utah Ct App 2000) 
Attorney fees . 
—Amount. 
Where the trial court addressed the three 
required findings necessary m awarding attor 
ney's fees, 1 e , the receiving spouse's financial 
need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees, an argu-
ment by the receiving spouse that was based on 
nothing more than her dissatisfaction with the 
award did not show an abuse of discretion by 
the trial court in awarding fees Childs v 
Childs, 967 P2d 942 (Utah Ct App 1998), cert 
denied, 982 P2d 88 (Utah 1999) 
—Criteria for award. 
Where the trial court found tha t one party 
had a need for attorney fees, tha t the other 
party had the ability to pay, and that the fees 
were necessary and reasonable, the findings 
were sufficient to affirm an award of fees based 
on the parties ' earned income ratios Rehn v 
Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 974 P2d 306 
—Find ings r e q u i r e d . 
It was an abuse of discretion foi the trial 
court to order the parties to a divorce proceed 
mg to pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
without making findings as to the recipient 
spouse's need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, 
and the reasonableness of the requested fees 
Wilde v Wilde, 969 P2d 438 (Utah Ct App 
1998) 
Where the trial coui t ordered both parties to 
pay their own attorney fees, but made no find-
ings about either party's need for or ability to 
pay attorney fees, remand was required for 
reconsideration and the entry of findings Wil-
liamson v Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, 983 
P 2 d 1103 
— R e a s o n a b l e . 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding the wife $ 2,500 in attorney fees, as 
the tr ial court was pei mitted to do so under this 
section and the trial court made sufficient find-
ings regarding the parties' income to support 
such an award Davis v Davis, 2003 UT App 
282, 479 Utah Adv Rep 6, 76 P3d 716 
—Timing. 
In a child support modification case, the 
court could ordei an awaid of attorney fees 
before receiving wife's attorney fees affidavit 
because the issue of fees was still before the 
court and late submission of the affidavit was 
not prejudicial to the father Remhart v Rein-
hart , 963 P2d 757 (Utah Ct App 1998) 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and parent-time — Determination of 
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifi-
cation. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
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(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children 
born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added 
to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of 
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall 
consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time 
or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any 
peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule 
entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of 
a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, 
or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate 
family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by 
the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-
time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children 
requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or 
operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any 
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by 
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the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living tha t existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties ' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, tha t change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances tha t justify that action. 
(hi) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds tha t the payor's improper conduct justifies tha t 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years tha t the marriage existed unless, a t any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court tha t a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remar-
riage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall 
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment 
and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court tha t a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
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the prospective support shall be the amount as stated in 
the order, without a showing of a material change of 
circumstances, if the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds 
the base child support award required by the guide-
lines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result 
of the obligor's voluntary reduction of income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in 
circumstances has occurred, or a petition to modify an order 
under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been filed, the court deter-
mining the amount of prospective support shall require each 
party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modify-
ing an existing award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guide-
lines, the court shall establish support after considering all 
relevant factors, including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or 
other benefits received by the adult child or on the adult 
child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; 
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(g) the ages of the parties; and 
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for 
the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall deter-
mine and assess all arrearages based upon the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines described in this chapter. 1998 
78-45-7.1. Medical expenses of dependent chi ldren — 
Assigning responsibi l i ty for payment — In-
surance coverage — Income withholding. 
The court shall include the following in its order: 
(1) a provision assigning responsibility for the payment 
of reasonable and necessary medical expenses for the 
dependent children; 
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and mainte-
nance of appropriate insurance for the medical expenses 
of dependent children, if coverage is or becomes available 
at a reasonable cost; and 
(3) provisions for income withholding, in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 1998 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidel ines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative 
order establishing or modifying an award of child support 
entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a 
rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the 
amount of temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions 
and considerations required by the guidelines, the award 
amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, 
and the use of worksheets consistent with these guide-
lines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under 
the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record 
supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of 
the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from 
use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in 
the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the 
presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated 
order. 
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the 
guidelines, if: 
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a 
nonguidelines order; 
(b) the guidelines worksheet has the box checked for a 
deviation and has an explanation as to the reason; or 
(c) the deviation was made because there were more 
children than provided for in the guidelines table. 
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the 
guidelines worksheet differ, but the difference is less than $10, 
the order shall not be considered deviated and the incomes 
listed on the worksheet may be used in adjusting support for 
emancipation. 
(6) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who 
live in the home of that parent and are not children in 
common to both parties may at the option of either party 
be taken into account under the guidelines in setting or 
modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsec-
tion (7). Credit may not be given if: 
(i) by giving credit to the obligor, children for 
whom a prior support order exists would have their 
child support reduced; or 
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present 
family, the obligation of the obligor would increase, 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that com-
pute the obligations of the respective parents for the 
additional children. The obligations shall then be sub-
tracted from the appropriate parent's income before de-
termining the award in the instant case. 
(7) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consider-
ation of natural or adoptive children born after entry of the 
order and who are not in common to both parties may be 
applied to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be 
applied: 
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would 
increase the support obligation of the obligor from the 
most recent order; or 
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of 
support received by the obligee would be decreased from 
the most recent order. 
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or 
modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal 
guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust the 
amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (8)(a), 
the court shall, taking into account the best interests of 
the child, determine whether there is a difference between 
the amount ordered and the amount that would be re-
quired under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% 
or more and the difference is not of a temporary nature, 
the court shall adjust the amount to that which is pro-
vided for in the guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances 
is not necessary for an adjustment under Subsection 
(8Kb). 
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any 
time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child 
support order if there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial 
change in circumstances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or 
assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income 
of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to 
earn; 
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(v) material changes in the medical needs of the 
child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities 
of either parent for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), 
the court shall, taking into account the best interests of 
the child, determine whether a substantial change has 
occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine whether 
the change results in a difference of 15% or more between 
the amount of child support ordered and the amount that 
would be required under the guidelines. If there is such a 
difference and the difference is not of a temporary nature, 
the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered 
to tha t which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order 
under Subsections (8) and (9) shall be included in each child 
support order issued or modified after July 1, 1997. 2003 
78-45-7.3. Procedure — Documentat ion — Stipulat ion. 
(1) In any matter in which child support is ordered, the 
moving party shall submit: 
{a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 
78-45-7.5(5); 
(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the 
amount of child support requested is consistent with the 
guidelines; and 
(d) the information required under Subsection (3). 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Sub-
section (1) is not available, a verified representation of the 
other party's income by the moving party, based on the 
best evidence available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only 
be offered after a copy has been provided to the other 
party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in 
an administrative proceeding. 
(3) Upon the entry of an order in a proceeding to establish 
paternity or to establish, modify, or enforce a support order, 
each party shall file identifying information and shall update 
that information as changes occur with the court tha t con-
ducted the proceeding. 
(a) The required identifying information shall include 
the person's social security number, driver's license num-
ber, residential and mailing addresses, telephone num-
bers, the name, address and telephone number of employ-
ers, and any other data required by the United States 
Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
(b) Attorneys representing the office in child support 
services cases are not required to file the identifying 
information required by Subsection (3)(a). 
(4) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child 
support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the 
stipulated child support amount or combined amount equals 
or exceeds the base child support award required by the 
guidelines. 2000 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each 
parent's share of the base combined child support obligation. 
Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child 
may be used to determine the award under these guidelines 
1994 
78-45-7.5. Determinat ion of gross income — Imputed 
income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including 
nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royal-
ties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, 
severance pay, pensions, interest, t rust income, alimony 
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social 
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unem-
ployment compensation, income replacement disability 
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-
tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the 
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if 
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent 
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his 
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 
3, Par t 3, Family Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, 
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security 
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, 
Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits re-
ceived by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of 
a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary 
expenses required for self-employment or business oper-
ation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from 
self-employment or operation of a business shall be re-
viewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income 
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. 
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to 
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection 
may differ from the amount of business income deter-
mined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be com-
puted on an annual basis and then recalculated to deter-
mine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current 
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs 
or employer statements and complete copies of tax re-
turns from at least the most recent year unless the court 
finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verifica-
tion of income from records maintained by the Depart-
ment of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay 
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to 
determine whether an underemployment or 
overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent 
under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the party de-
faults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a 
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed 
or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based upon employment potential and probable earnings 
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar back-
grounds in the community, or the median earning ft>r 
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical 
area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their 
occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least 
at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. T3 
impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceed-
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(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order 
to: 
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of 
the dependent child; or 
(ii) obtain insurance for medical expenses but fails 
to do so, or 
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under 
insurance coverage obtained after the prior court or 
administrative order was issued. 
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not 
specify what proportions of the expenses are to be shared, the 
district court may determine the amount of liability as may be 
reasonable and necessary. 
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when 
it was issued. 1994 
78-45-7.20. Accountabil i ty of support provided to ben-
efit child -— Accounting. 
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the 
initial or modified order for child support may, upon the 
petition of the obligor, order prospectively the obligee to 
furnish an accounting of amounts provided for the child's 
benefit to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts. 
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the 
frequency and the form of the accounting which shall include 
receipts and an accounting. 
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting only if 
current on all child support that has been ordered. 1994 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exempt ion for dependent chil-
dren. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be 
awarded the right to claim a child or children as exemptions 
for federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the parties 
otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or administrative 
agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative 
agency shall consider: 
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of 
each parent to the cost of raising the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each 
parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or adminis-
trative agency may not award any exemption to the noncus-
todial parent if that parent is not current in his child support 
obligation, in which case the court or administrative agency 
may award an exemption to the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless 
the award will result in a tax benefit to that parent. 1994 
78-45-7.22. Social security number in court records. 
The social security number of any individual who is subject 
to a support order shall be placed in the records relating to the 
matter. 1997 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdict ion. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the 
order of support where justice requires. 1957 
78-45-9. Enforcement of r ight of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against 
the obligor. The office may proceed pursuant to this 
chapter or any other applicable statute on behalf of: 
(i) the Department of Human Services; 
(ii) any other department or agency of this state 
that provides public assistance, as defined by Subsec-
tion 62A-ll-303(3), to enforce the right to recover 
public assistance; or 
(iii) the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of 
support against the obligor. 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the 
office to enforce payment of the obligor's support obliga-
tion, the attorney general or the county attorney of the 
county of residence of the obligee shall represent the 
office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a plead-
ing, or submit a written stipulation to the court, without 
complying with Subsection (2Kb), if the purpose or effect 
of the action, pleading, or stipulation is to: 
(i) establish paternity; 
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation; 
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment 
of support; 
(iv) recover support due or owing; or 
(v) appeal issues regarding child support laws. 
(b) (i) When taking an action described in Subsection 
(2)(a), a person must file an affidavit with the court at 
the time the action is commenced, the pleading is 
filed, or the stipulation is submitted stating whether 
child support services have been or are being pro-
vided under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C., Section 601 et seq., on behalf of a child who is 
a subject of the action, pleading, or stipulation. 
(ii) If child support services have been or are being 
provided, under Part IV of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C., Section 601 et seq., the person shall mail a 
copy of the affidavit and a copy of the pleading or 
stipulation to the Office of the Attorney General, 
Child Support Division. 
(iii) If notice is not given in accordance with this 
Subsection (2), the office is not bound by any decision, 
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered in the 
action. For purposes of appeals, service must be made 
on the Office of the Director for the Office of Recovery 
Services. 
(c) If IV-D services have been or are being provided, 
that person shall join the office as a party to the action, or 
mail or deliver a written request to the Office of the 
Attorney General, Child Support Division asking the 
office to join as a party to the action. A copy of that 
request, along with proof of service, shall be filed with the 
court. The office shall be represented as provided in 
Subsection (1Kb). 
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney 
represents or has an attorney-client relationship with the 
obligee or the obligor in carrying out the duties under this 
chapter. 2003 
78-45-9.1. Repealed. 1984 
78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee. 
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance to an 
obligee desiring to proceed under this act in the following 
manner: 
(1) provide forms, approved by the Judicial Council of 
Utah, for an order of wage assignment if the obligee is not 
represented by legal counsel; 
(2) the county attorney's office may charge a fee not to 
exceed $25 for providing assistance to an obligee under 
Subsection (1). 
(3) inform the obligee of the right to file impecuniously 
if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses of the action 
and assist the obligee with such filing; 
(4) advise the obligee of the available methods for 
service of process; and 
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a 
hearing before the court. 1983 
78-45-9.3. Payment under child support order — Judg-
ment. 
(1) All monthly payments of child support shall be due on 
the 1st day of each month for purposes of child support 
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services pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 3, income 
withholding services pursuant to Par t 4, and income withhold-
ing procedures pursuant to Part 5 
(2) For purposes of child support services and income with-
holding pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 11, Par t 3 and Par t 4, 
child support is not considered past due until the 1st day of the 
following month For purposes other than those specified in 
Subsection (1) support shall be payable XA by the 5th day of 
each month and Vz by the 20th day of that month, unless the 
order or decree provides for a different time for payment 
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support 
under any child support order, as defined by Section 78-45-2, 
is, on and after the date it is due 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of 
any judgment of a district court, except as provided in 
Subsection (4), 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in 
this and in any other jurisdiction, and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any 
other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (4) 
(4) A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any period 
during which a modification is pending, but only from the date 
of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the 
petitioner, or on the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner' If7 
the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the I 
effective date of the modification shall be the month following/ 
service on the parent whose support is affected Once the 
tribunal determines tha t a modification is appropriate, the 
tribunal shall order a judgment to be entered for any differ-
ence m the original order and the modified amount for the 
period from the service of the pleading until the final order of 
modification is entered 
(5) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state 
or political subdivision, a territory or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or other comparable 
domestic or foreign jurisdiction 
(6) The judgment provided for in Subsection (3)(a), to be 
effective and enforceable as a hen against the real property 
interest of any third party relying on the public record, shall 
be docketed in the district court in accordance with Sections 
78-22 1 and 62A-11-312 5 2003 
78-45-10. Appeals . 
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments under 
this act as in other civil actions 1957 
78-45-11. Husband and wife privi leged communicat ion 
inapplicable — Competency of spouses . 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of commu 
mcations between husband and wife are inapplicable under 
this act Spouses are competent witnesses to testify to any 
relevant matter, including marriage and parentage 1957 
78-45-12. Rights are in addit ion to those present ly 
exist ing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in 
substitution to any other rights 1957 
78-45-13. Interpretat ion and construct ion. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectu-
ate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states 
which enact it 1957 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY [REPEALED] 
78-45a-l to 78-45a-17. Repealed. 2005 
CHAPTER 45b 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN [REPEALED] 
78-45b-l to 78-45b-25. Repealed. 1985,1987,1988 
CHAPTER 45c 
UTAH UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 
Section 
78-45c-l to 78-45c-26 Repealed 
Part 1 
General Provis ions 
78-45c-101 Title 
78-45c-102 Definitions 
78-45c-103 Proceedings governed by other law 
78-45c-104 Application to Indian tribes 
78-45c-105 International application of chapter 
78-45c-106 Binding force of child custody determmation 
78 45c-107 Priority 
78-45c-108 Notice to persons outside state 
78 45c-109 Appearance and limited immunity 
78-45c-110 Communication between courts 
78 45c-111 Taking testimony 111 another state 
78-45c 112 Cooperation between courts — Preservation of 
records 
Part 2 
Jur isd ic t ion 
78-45c-201 Initial child custody jurisdiction 
78-45c-202 Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
78-45c-203 Jurisdiction to modify determination 
78-45c 204 Temporary emergency jurisdiction 
78-45c-205 Notice — Opportunity to be heard — Joinder 
78-45c-206 Simultaneous proceedings 
78 45c 207 Inconvenient forum 
78-45c-208 Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct 
78 45c-209 Information to be submitted to court 
78-45c-210 Appearance of parties and child 
Part 3 
Enforcement 
78-45c-301 Definitions 
78-45c-302 Scope — Hague Convention Enforcement 
78 45c-303 Duty to enforce 
78-45c-304 Temporary paient-time 
78-45c 305 Registration of child custody determination 
78-45c 306 Enforcement of registered determmation 
78-45c-307 Simultaneous proceedings 
78-45c-308 Expedited enforcement of child custody deter-
mination 
78-45c 309 Service of petition and order 
78-45c 310 Hearing and order 
78-45c-311 Writ to take physical custody of child 
78-45c-312 Costs, fees, and expenses 
78-45c-313 Recognition and enforcement 
78-45c 314 Appeals 
78-45c-315 Role of prosecutoi or attorney general 
78 45c-316 Role of law enforcement 
78 45c-317 Costs and expenses 
78-45c-318 Transitional provision 
78-45c-l to 78-45c-26. Repealed. 2000 
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the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the 
•lc]o-ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction, 
(d> Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in 
whole or in part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered 
upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such 
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, 
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution 
shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall 
direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from the 
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction 
of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the county 
where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, 
or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the 
clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment may have 
been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as 
in the county where the same was originally entered. 
Compiler's No tes . — There is no federal 
rule covering this subject matter. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Acceptance of full payment. Attachment. 
Effect. Court had duty to make order directing par-
Attachment ^ a ^ satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
v, ,.
 r J-- c 4-- collected through attachment proceeding. 
Vacation of satisfaction. ^ ^
 y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p »m ^ 
Acceptance of full p a y m e n t . Vacation of satisfaction. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
—Effect. by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay- action and hearing in equity and the lien of an 
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction attorney against the proceeds of the judgment 
.. and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge does not include his personal right to execute 
everything merged in and adjudicated by the against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. Fed. 
•judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 R2d 1187 (Utah 
Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916). 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
§ 1004 et seq. judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment* 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
' (a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
Prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on 
a ny question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
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chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the appli-
cation, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
tha t it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not 
ground for new trial, U.R.C.P. 61. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Burden of proof. 
Caption on motion for new trial. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
Costs. 
Decision against law. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Evidence. 
—Insufficiency. 
—Sufficiency. 
Excessive or inadequate damages. 
—Punitive damages. 
—Waiver. 
Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Failure to order discover}7. 
Filing of affidavits. 
Grounds for new trial. 
—Particularization in motion 
Improper statement by counsel. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to alter or amend judgment. 
Motion to be presented to trial court. 
Juror 's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Lot Rule 606. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
Sanctions. 
Settlement bars appeal. 
Summary judgment. 
Time for motion. 
Tolling time for appeal. 
Waiver. 
Cited. 
A b a n d o n m e n t of m o t i o n . 
Abandonment of motion for new trial must be 
intentional, and the facts must indicate this 
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1984). 
A c c i d e n t o r s u r p r i s e . 
This section requires that the moving party 
show that ordinary prudence was exercised to 
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers 
v. Genes Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 
(Utah 1977). 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on the 
basis of surprise concerning testimony of the 
defendant s expert witness where the plaintiff 
failed to object to the testimony either before, or 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
